This paper estimates the effect of social connectedness on crime across U.S. cities from 1970 to 2009. Migration networks among African Americans from the South generated variation across destinations in the concentration of migrants from the same birth town. Using this novel source of variation, we find that social connectedness considerably reduces murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, burglaries, and motor vehicle thefts, with a one standard deviation increase in social connectedness reducing murders by 21 percent and motor vehicle thefts by 20 percent. Social connectedness especially reduces murders of adolescents and young adults committed during gang and drug activity. JEL Classification Codes: K42, N32, R23, Z13
Introduction
For almost 200 years, the enormous variance of crime rates across space has intrigued social scientists and policy makers (Guerry, 1833; Quetelet, 1835; Weisburd, Bruinsma and Bernasco, 2009 ). Prior work finds that standard covariates explain less than one-third of the cross-city variation in crime rates, which suggests a potential role for social influences (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996) . One possible explanation is peer effects, whereby an individual is more likely to commit crime if his peers commit crime (e.g., Case and Katz, 1991; Damm and Dustmann, 2014) . Another explanation is that cities differ in the degree of social connectedness, or the strength of relationships between individuals, including those unlikely to commit crime. This paper uses a new source of variation in social connectedness to estimate its effect on crime.
Migration networks among millions of African Americans who moved out of the U.S. South from 1915 to 1970 generated variation across destinations in the concentration of migrants from the same birth town. For example, consider Beloit, Wisconsin and Middletown, Ohio, two cities similar along many dimensions, including the total number of Southern black migrants that moved there. Around 18 percent of Beloit's black migrants came from Pontotoc, Mississippi, while less than five percent of Middletown's migrants came from any single town. Historical accounts trace the sizable migration from Pontotoc to Beloit to a single influential migrant, John McCord, getting a job in 1914 at a manufacturer in search of workers (Bell, 1933) . Furthermore, ethnographic and newspaper accounts suggest that Southern birth town networks translated into strong community ties in the North (Stack, 1974; Associated Press, 1983; Laury, 1986; Crowder and Spencer, 2002; Smith, 2006) . Guided by a simple economic model, we proxy for social connectedness using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of birth town to destination city population flows for African Americans born in the South from 1916 to 1936, who we observe in the Duke SSA/Medicare dataset.
We focus on social connectedness among black migrants because birth town migration networks are especially strong among this group (Stuart and Taylor, 2018) and qualitative and quantitative evidence supports our empirical strategy.
We estimate regressions that relate cross-city differences in crime from 1970 to 2009 to cross-city differences in social connectedness. The historical literature suggests that, conditional on economic and social opportunities, variation in social connectedness stems from idiosyncratic factors, like the right migrant being in the right place at the right time. To exploit this variation, we control for population, manufacturing employment (the sector employing the largest number of African American migrants), and the black population share from 1920 to 1960. Our regressions also include the number of Southern black migrants that live in each city, to adjust for differences in the overall attractiveness of cities to black migrants, and contemporaneous population, land area, and state-by-year fixed effects. City-level crime counts come from FBI Uniform Crime Reports.
We find that social connectedness leads to sizable reductions in crime rates. The elasticity of the crime rate with respect to social connectedness ranges from -0.07 to -0.25 across the seven index crimes of murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, and is statistically distinguishable from zero for every crime besides larceny. At the mean, a one standard deviation increase in social connectedness leads to a precisely estimated 21 percent decrease in murder, the best measured crime in FBI data. Our estimates imply that replacing Middletown's social connectedness with that of Beloit would decrease murders, robberies, and motor vehicle thefts by 28 to 30 percent. By comparison, the estimates in Chalfin and McCrary (2018) imply that a similar decrease in murders would require a 44 percent increase in the number of police officers.
Because social connectedness arises from individuals' location decisions, a natural concern is whether our estimates reflect causal effects. The validity of our empirical strategy hinges upon whether social connectedness is correlated with unobserved determinants of crime from 1970 to 2009, conditional on the covariates described above. Historical accounts emphasize the importance of migrants who were well-connected in their birth town and who worked for an employer in search of labor in establishing concentrated migration flows from Southern birth towns to Northern cities (Scott, 1920; Bell, 1933; Gottlieb, 1987; Grossman, 1989) . It is unlikely that these idiosyncratic factors are correlated with unobserved determinants of crime some 50 years later. These considerations provide qualitative support for our empirical strategy.
We marshal a wide range of quantitative support for our empirical strategy. First, 78 percent of the variation in social connectedness stems from a single birth town to destination city migration flow. This accords with historical accounts emphasizing the importance of idiosyncratic factors.
Second, social connectedness is not correlated with murder rates from 1911 to 1916 or 1936 to 1939 . This implies that connected groups of migrants did not simply move to low crime cities.
To provide even stronger support, we show that our results are robust to selection on both observed and unobserved variables. Our results are similar when including a battery of additional controls: contemporaneous economic and demographic factors, the number and concentration of white migrants and immigrants, and characteristics of counties from which migrants came. Our results also are robust to controlling for the share of migrants drawn to each destination by a birth town migration network. This variable, which we estimate using a structural model of location decisions, controls for a range of unobserved migrant characteristics. Finally, we develop a more general test of selection on unobserved variables. The main threat to identification is that connected groups of migrants moved to cities with low crime rates, and unobserved determinants of crime persisted over time. In the presence of this unobserved selection, controlling for the [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] crime rate would eliminate the relationship between crime and social connectedness from 1970 to 2009. In contrast, if our empirical strategy is valid, then controlling for the 1960-1969 crime rate would partly attenuate the estimated effect of social connectedness and this attenuation would diminish over time; this is exactly what we find, which rules out the main threat to identification.
All of this evidence supports our empirical strategy.
A number of additional results clarify the mechanisms through which social connectedness reduces crime. Social connectedness reduces crimes that are more and less likely to have witnesses, which suggests that an increased probability of detection is not the only operative mechanism.
The effect of social connectedness on crime is not driven by effects on employment, education, homeownership, the prevalence of single parents, or crack cocaine use. Other mechanisms, such as effects on non-cognitive skills, personality traits, and norms, likely matter. We see the largest reductions in murders of adolescents and young adults, committed by acquaintances or strangers, in the course of gang, drug, and other felonious activity. Furthermore, the effect of social con-nectedness on crime is persistent: even in the 2000s, when many of the original Southern migrants were no longer alive, crime rates were lower in cities with higher social connectedness. Natural explanations for this persistence include changing norms or skills, which are passed down across generations, and path dependence in crime (Nagin and Paternoster, 1991) .
There is widespread interest in the effects of social connectedness and the related concept of social capital.
1 This interest partly stems from the possibility that relationships between individuals can address market failures and generate desirable outcomes that are difficult to accomplish with government policies. However, estimating the effects of social connectedness and social capital has proven challenging. Some of the most influential evidence comes from correlations between outcomes, such as income and crime, and proxies for social capital, like individuals' participation in community organizations, their stated willingness to intervene in the community, and their stated willingness to trust others (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997; Putnam, 2000) . These proxies for social capital reflect individuals' contemporaneous decision to invest in their community, which raises the concern that these correlations reflect reverse causality or omitted variables bias. As a result, the empirical importance of social capital continues to be debated (Durlauf, 2002) . This stands in contrast to several papers that credibly identify peer effects in crime.
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We use variation in social connectedness that has the unusual and attractive property of be-1 Although definitions of social capital vary, Portes (1998) argues that a consensus definition is "the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures" (p. 6). In discussing social capital, authors typically emphasize the role of trust and reciprocity (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000; Bowles and Gintis, 2002) . Social connectedness is a broader concept than social capital, as Karlan (2007) ing established decades before we measure outcomes as the result of a known process -birth town migration networks. This facilitates our primary contribution, which is providing new, more credible evidence on the effect of social connectedness on crime. We also contribute to the literature in economics studying how social capital and trust relate to various outcomes, including growth and development, government efficiency and public good provision, financial development, microfinance, and intergenerational mobility.
More broadly, there is enormous interest in the causes and consequences of criminal activity and incarceration in U.S. cities, especially for African Americans (Freeman, 1999; Neal and Rick, 2014; Evans, Garthwaite and Moore, 2016) , and this paper demonstrates the importance of social connectedness in reducing crime. Our results imply that policies which lower social connectedness, including mass incarceration, could have more negative consequences than commonly understood.
We also add to the literature on the consequences of the Great Migration for migrants and cities, which has not considered the effects of social connectedness before (e.g., Scroggs, 1917; Smith and Welch, 1989; Margo, 1990; Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath, 1996; Collins, 1997; Boustan, 2009 Boustan, , 2010 Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014; Black et al., 2015) . Our work complements research on the effects of immigration on crime (Bell and Machin, 2013) . Much of this literature focuses on how crime depends on the number of immigrants and the types of countries from which immigrants originate. By comparison, this paper focuses on the role of social connectedness among a more homogenous group of domestic migrants. This paper draws on Stuart and Taylor (2018), which examines the role of birth town migration networks in more detail. (Scroggs, 1917; Scott, 1920; Gottlieb, 1987; Marks, 1989; Margo, 1990; Jackson, 1991; Collins, 1997; Gregory, 2005) .
However, many underlying causes existed long before the war, including a less developed Southern economy, the decline in agricultural labor demand due to the boll weevil's destruction of crops (Scott, 1920; Marks, 1989 Marks, , 1991 Lange, Olmstead and Rhode, 2009) , widespread labor market discrimination (Marks, 1991) , and racial violence and unequal treatment (Tolnay and Beck, 1991) .
Migrants tended to follow paths established by railroad lines: Mississippi-born migrants generally moved to Illinois and other Midwestern states, and South Carolina-born migrants generally moved to New York and Pennsylvania (Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath, 1996; Collins, 1997; Boustan, 2010; Black et al., 2015) . Labor agents, offering paid transportation, employment, and housing, directed some of the earliest migrants, but their role diminished after the 1920s, and most individuals paid for the relatively expensive train fares themselves (Gottlieb, 1987; Grossman, 1989) . 4 African-American newspapers from the largest destinations circulated throughout the South, providing information on life in the North (Gottlieb, 1987; Grossman, 1989 (Rubin, 1960; Gottlieb, 1987 Qualitative evidence documents the impact of social ties among African Americans from the 6 The following paragraph draws on Bell (1933) . See also Knowles (2010 household, children were raised by "discipliners . . . allowed to participate in the control of children," "trainers [who] not only discipline but teach moral values and respect for adults," and older children who learned these behaviors from adults (p. 84). This environment clearly could have reduced crime. Motivated by these accounts, we now turn to a systematic analysis of the effect of social connectedness on crime.
Conceptual Framework: Crime and Social Connectedness
To inform our empirical work, we next describe the ways in which social connectedness might affect crime. As a starting point, consider younger and older individuals, with the key distinction being that younger individuals might commit crime, while older individuals do not. In deciding whether to commit crime, younger individuals are influenced by non-social factors, peer effects, 8 The 40 percent figure comes from the Duke SSA/Medicare dataset, described below.
and social connectedness. The non-social determinants of crime include employment opportunities and the degree of policing, among other factors. Peer effects matter because youth are influenced by the crime decisions of other youth. In our setting, social connectedness is analogous to social cohesion among older individuals that stems from a shared birth town.
Social connectedness could directly affect crime in several ways. For example, it might reduce crime by increasing the probability a criminal is identified and punished, helping individuals find jobs, increasing the stock of cognitive and non-cognitive skills that boost earnings in the non-crime labor market, or promoting anti-crime norms. Alternatively, social connectedness could increase crime by reinforcing unproductive norms or providing trust that facilitates criminal activity, as with the Ku Klux Klan, Mafia, or gangs (Fukuyama, 2000; Putnam, 2000) . The work of Stack (1974) suggests that social connectedness might decrease crime in our setting, but this is ultimately an empirical question.
The total effect of social connectedness depends on these direct effects plus peer effects and spillovers. Suppose that social connectedness among Southern black migrants directly affects only African American youth (e.g., because of segregation). Social connectedness could indirectly affect non-black youth through peer effects that link the crime decisions of black and non-black youth (e.g., because of gang activity). These peer effects could amplify the direct effect of social connectedness, providing one reason why social connectedness among Southern black migrants could affect city-level crime rates. Another reason is that, although African Americans account for a minority of the population, they account for a majority of the crimes reported to police in the cities we study.
Appendix A contains a simple model that formalizes these forces. We show that if social connectedness reduces the crime rate of African Americans with ties to the South, then social connectedness weakly reduces the crime rate of all groups, as long as the equilibrium is stable and peer effects are non-negative. In this situation, the crime-reducing effect of social connectedness among Southern African Americans is not counteracted by higher crime rates among other groups. A symmetric result holds if social connectedness instead increases the crime rate of African Americans 9 00860 9
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with ties to the South. An additional takeaway from the model is that the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index emerges as a natural way to measure the degree of social connectedness in each destination city. Guided by this theoretical analysis, we next describe our empirical strategy for estimating the effect of social connectedness on crime. We return to mechanisms below.
Data and Empirical Strategy

Data on Crime, Social Connectedness, and Control Variables
We estimate the effect of social connectedness on crime from 1970 to 2009, since the Great Migration ended around 1970. We measure annual city-level crime counts using FBI Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR) data, available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). UCR data contain monthly counts of the number of offenses reported to police, which we aggregate to the city-year level. We focus on the seven commonly studied index crimes:
murder and non-negligent manslaughter ("murder"), forcible rape ("rape"), robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. Murder is the best measured crime, and robbery and motor vehicle theft are also relatively well-measured (Blumstein, 2000; Tibbetts, 2012) . Missing crimes are indistinguishable from true zeros in the UCR. Because cities in our sample almost certainly experience property crime each year, in our main analysis we drop all city-years in which any of the three property crimes (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft) equal zero. 9 We also use annual population estimates from the Census Bureau in the UCR data.
The Duke SSA/Medicare dataset provides the birth town to destination city population flows that underlie our measure of social connectedness. The data contain sex, race, date of birth, date of death (if deceased), and the ZIP code of residence at old age (death or 2001, whichever is earlier)
for over 70 million individuals who received Medicare Part B from 1976 to 2001. In addition, the data include a 12-character string with self-reported birth town information from the Social Security Administration NUMIDENT file, which is matched to places (see Black et al., 2015) .
9 At least one property crime equals zero in four percent of city-year observations. 10 00860 9
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These data capture long-run location decisions, as we only observe individuals' location at birth and old age. 10 Hence, our measure of social connectedness for each city does not vary over time.
We focus on individuals born from 1916 to 1936 in the former Confederate states, which we refer to as the South. Out-migration rates for the 1916-1936 cohorts are among the highest of all cohorts in the Great Migration (Appendix Figure A. 1), and coverage rates decline considerably for earlier and later cohorts (Black et al., 2015) . We restrict our main analysis sample to cities with at least 25 Southern-born black migrants in the Duke dataset to improve the reliability of our estimates.
Census county and city data books provide covariates each decade from 1920 to 2000. In 1920
and 1930, we have county-level covariates. Starting in 1940, we have city-level covariates for cities with at least 25,000 residents. Consequently, our main sample contains cities with at least 25,000 residents from 1940-forward. We limit our sample to cities in the Northeast, Midwest, and West Census regions to focus on the cross-region moves that characterize the Great Migration.
Our main analysis sample excludes cities with especially severe measurement errors in the crime data, as described in Appendix B. Appendix Tables A.1 
Estimating the Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime
Our main estimating equation is
where Y k,t is the number of crimes in city k in year t. The key variable of interest is our proxy for social connectedness among African Americans with ties to the South, HHI k = j (N j,k /N k ) 2 , 10 As described in detail below, there is relatively little migration for our sample after leaving the South, so our ability to observe individuals' location only in old age is not particularly important. 11 Of these, 112 cities can be reached from the South via one railroad line, 111 cities via two lines (i.e., one connection is required), and one city (Lynn, Massachusetts) is linked via three lines. where N j,k is the number of migrants from birth town j that live in destination city k, and N k ≡ j N j,k is the total number of migrants. A Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a natural way to measure social connectedness, as discussed in Section 3. X k,t is a vector of covariates, including log population and other variables described below, and k,t captures unobserved determinants of crime. 12 We use an exponential function in equation (1) because there are no murders for many city-year observations (Appendix Table A .1).
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Our proxy for social connectedness varies only across cities, but the number of crimes varies across both cities and years. Instead of collapsing the data into city-level observations, we use equation (1) because our panel of cities is not balanced. 14 We cluster standard errors by city to allow for arbitrary autocorrelation in unobserved determinants of crime.
The key parameter of interest is δ, which we interpret as the elasticity of the crime rate with respect to HHI k , because we control for log population and specify the conditional mean as an exponential function. If social connectedness reduces the city-level crime rate, then δ < 0. We estimate δ using cross-city variation in social connectedness, conditional on the total number of migrants and X k,t . The key identifying assumption is
which states that, conditional on the number of migrants living in city k and the vector of control variables, social connectedness is independent of unobserved determinants of crime from 1970 to 12 Because equation (1) includes ln(HHI k ), ln(N k ), and log population, our estimate of δ would be identical if we instead used city population as the denominator of HHI k . 13 We estimate the parameters in equation (1) using a Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator. Consistent estimation of (δ, θ, β) requires the assumption that
, but does not require any restriction on the conditional variance of the error term (Wooldridge, 2002) . Given this, we use the representation in equation (1) to facilitate discussion of our assumptions about unobserved determinants of crime. 14 Estimating regressions on data collapsed to the city-level yields nearly identical results. (Gottlieb, 1987; Grossman, 1989) . Moving costs mattered in a specific way:
migrants moved along vertical routes established by railroad lines, but along a railroad line, there was little variation in the cost of moving to different destinations.
Our main specification includes several variables that bolster the credibility of condition (2).
We control for the log number of Southern black migrants to account for a broad set of factors that, via revealed preference, influenced the attractiveness of destinations to black migrants. We also control for log population, the African American population share, and log manufacturing employment from 1920 to 1960, as these variables could affect the strength of social connectedness and be correlated with later determinants of crime. We control for log population in year t and log land area, so that we also control for log population density. State-by-year fixed effects flexibly 15 Condition (2) does not guarantee identification of the other parameters in equation (1) besides δ. For example, identification of θ requires exogenous variation in the total number of migrants.
Boustan (2010) provides one possible strategy for identifying θ, but we do not pursue that here.
See also Derenoncourt (2019). 1955-1960, 1965-1970, 1975-1980, 1985-1990, and 1995-2000 . This suggests that our inability to construct HHI k using migrants' location before 1970 is relatively unimportant.
Initial Evidence on the Validity of the Empirical Strategy
Before discussing our results, we present initial evidence that supports the validity of our empirical strategy. We first examine whether social connectedness stems from a large concentration of migrants from a single birth town. If idiosyncratic factors drive social connectedness, then a single sending town should account for most of the variation. Consistent with this, Figure 1 shows that 78 percent of the variation in log HHI is explained by the leading term of log HHI, which equals the log squared share of migrants from the top sending town.
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Second, we examine whether crime rates in the early twentieth century are correlated with social connectedness. If connected groups of migrants moved to cities with low crime rates, and these low crime rates persisted into the 1970s and beyond, then this would threaten our empirical strategy. Table A .2).
Addressing Threats to Empirical Strategy Selection on Observed Variables
We first examine the robustness of our results to a battery of additional covariates. We focus on the effect of social connectedness on murder, given its importance for welfare and higher measurement quality. Column 1 of Table 3 repeats our baseline specification to facilitate comparisons. In column 2, we control for the contemporaneous share of the population that is African American and female. 24 In column 3, we control for the share of the population age 5-17, 18-64, and 65+, and the share with a high school and college degree. In column 4, we control for log median family income, the unemployment rate, the labor force participation rate, and log manufacturing employment. We add these variables because they could be correlated with social connectedness and unobserved determinants of crime, biasing our estimate of δ. However, social connectedness might affect some of these variables, in which case controlling for them would eliminate the original omitted variables bias while introducing another source of bias. 25 In practice, the coefficient on log HHI changes very little when including these variables.
Next, we control for log HHI and the log number of Southern white migrants and foreign immigrants, using country of origin for the latter group. In principle, social connectedness among population is 94,081 and 101,727; and the 1980 percent black is 14.6 and 15.9. 24 When explaining crime in year t, we use the variable from the decade in which t lies. Demographic and economic variables are available every ten years from 1970 to 2000, except for percent with a high school degree and college degree (not observed in 2000), log median family income (not observed in 2000), and manufacturing share (not observed in 2000). We use the 1990 values of these unavailable variables. Appendix B has additional details on the sample and data. 25 In the language of Angrist and Pischke (2009) , this is a "proxy control" situation (p. 66).
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology these groups could affect crime. We focus on the results for Southern black migrants because previous work documents the importance of birth town migration networks (Stuart and Taylor, 2018) and we are most confident in the validity of condition (2) and the interpretation of HHI as reflecting social connectedness for this group. While we do not assign a causal interpretation to the additional variables, they could be correlated with omitted determinants of crime. As seen in column 5, our results are very similar when including these variables. Column 6 shows that our results also are similar when controlling for racial fragmentation (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000) plus the share of the population that is Hispanic, foreign born, speaks only English at home, and speaks English well or very well.
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Another possible concern is that our results reflect the characteristics of migrants' birth place, as opposed to social connectedness. To examine this, we construct migrant-weighted averages of Southern birth county characteristics. We use the 1920 Census to measure the black farm ownership rate, black literacy rate, black population density, percent black, and percent rural. We also measure exposure to Rosenwald schools, which increased educational attainment among African Americans in the South (Aaronson and Mazumder, 2011) . Our results are very similar when adding these variables, as seen in column 7.
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Columns 2-7 of 
Selection on Unobserved Variables: Using a Structural Migration Model
One concern is that our estimate of δ is biased by unobserved characteristics of certain migrantsthose who chose the same destination as other migrants from their birth town. Census data reveal that Southern black migrants living in a state or metropolitan area with a higher share of migrants from their birth state have less education and income (Appendix Table A.7) . 28 As a result, migrants who followed their birth town network likely had less education and earnings capacity than other migrants. This negative selection on education and earnings could generate a positive correlation between HHI k and k,t , biasing our estimate of δ upwards, and making it harder to conclude that social connectedness reduces crime (e.g., Lochner and Moretti, 2004) .
At the same time, migrants who followed their birth town network might display greater cooperation or other pro-social behaviors. To address this possibility, we estimate a structural model of location decisions, originally developed in Stuart and Taylor (2018), which generates the share of migrants that moved to each destination because of their birth town migration network. When used as a covariate in equation (1), this variable proxies for unobserved characteristics of migrants that chose to follow other migrants from their birth town. We sketch this model in the text, leaving some details to Appendix C.
In the model, migrants from birth town j are indexed on a circle by i ∈ {1, . . . , N j }, where N j is the total number of migrants. For migrant i, destination k belongs to one of three preference groups: high (H i ), medium (M i ), or low (L i ). The high preference group contains a single destination. In the absence of social interactions between migrants, the destination in H i is most preferred, and destinations in M i are preferred over those in L i . 29 A migrant never moves to a destination 28 Research on immigrants in the U.S. finds similar patterns of selection (Bartel, 1989; Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010 Migrants from the same birth town can differ in their preferences over destinations. The probability that destination k is in the high preference group for a migrant from town j is h j,k ≡ P[k ∈ H i |i ∈ j], and the probability that destination k is in the medium preference group is
. These probabilities arise from expected utility maximization problems solved by migrants. We do not need to specify migrants' utility functions, but expected wages and transportation costs are among the relevant factors. We also do not need to specify why some migrants choose the same destination as their neighbor. For example, neighbors might provide information about employment opportunities, or migrants might value living near friends and family.
The share of migrants from birth town j that chose destination k because of social interactions equals m j,k . As a result, the share of migrants that chose this destination because of social inter- (1) Column 8 of Table 3 shows that the estimated effect of social connectedness changes little when we control for the share of migrants that chose their destination because of their birth town migration network. 30 We find little evidence that our results are driven by unobserved characteristics of certain migrants. For completeness, column 9 includes all of the additional covariates previously described. The effect of social connectedness is similar in magnitude and statistically significant.
As noted above, column 9 is not our preferred specification, because some of the covariates could be affected by social connectedness.
Selection on Unobserved Variables: Using Lagged Crime Rates
Although we have addressed many potential concerns, it is possible that cities with higher social connectedness have lower unobserved determinants of crime, k,t , for some other reason. For example, if connected groups of migrants moved to cities with low crime rates, and unobserved determinants of crime persisted over time, then our estimate of δ could be biased downwards. We have already presented evidence against this threat by showing that log HHI is not correlated with murder rates from 1936 to 1939 (Table 1) or 1911 to 1916 (Appendix Table A .5).
To provide more direct evidence against this threat, we estimate the effect of social connectedness on crime for each five-year interval from 1970 to 2009 while controlling for the [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] log mean crime rate. If our results were driven by connected groups of migrants initially sorting into cities with low crime rates and unobserved determinants of crime persisting over time, then controlling for the 1960-1969 crime rate would eliminate the correlation between social connectedness and crime rates in later years. On the other hand, if condition (2) is valid and there is a true effect of social connectedness, then controlling for the 1960-1969 crime rate will not completely attenuate the estimate of δ; adding this control could attenuate estimates because unobserved determinants of crime are serially correlated, but the attenuation would diminish with time. 30 Results are very similar when we use quadratic, cubic, or quartic functions of this variable.
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To see this more formally, consider a simple linear model,
where δ t is the effect of social connectedness on crime in year t, ρ ∈ (−1, 1) captures serial correlation in unobserved determinants of crime, E[u k,t | k,t−1 ] = 0, and we ignore other covariates.
We use a linear model to simplify the analysis, but we have used Monte Carlo simulations to verify that the main conclusion holds with an exponential conditional mean function in equation (3). Because there is little migration after 1960 (Appendix Table A 
It is straightforward to show that
Equation (6) shows that controlling for the 1960 crime rate eliminates the selection bias that arises if cov[ln(HHI k ), k,t ] = 0. However, if there is an effect of social connectedness on crime in 1960 and unobserved determinants of crime are serially correlated, thend t is a biased estimator of δ t .
As t increases, the bias declines as the correlation of k,t with k,1960 declines. (6) if our empirical strategy were valid: there is some attenuation, but this declines over time, and the two sets of point estimates converge. We conclude that our results are not driven by the sorting of connected groups of migrants into low crime cities, but instead reflect the effect of social connectedness on crime. This rules out a large set of threats to our empirical strategy. Appendix D describes several additional robustness tests, all of which support our findings.
Mechanisms
The previous results show that social connectedness reduces city-level crime rates, demonstrate the robustness of this finding, and support the validity of our empirical strategy. So far, we have estimated the overall effect of social connectedness on crime rates. We next present results that clarify our main finding and the underlying mechanisms.
Several potential mechanisms stem from previous theoretical and empirical work. For example, social connectedness could increase the probability that criminals are identified and punished, increase formal labor market opportunities through job referrals, increase homeownership through shared information or resources, increase the number of single-parent households (by providing additional resources for childrearing) or decrease the number of single-parent households (by increasing the costs faced by less-active parents), increase cognitive skills, increase non-cognitive skills such as self-control and forward-looking behavior, affect personality traits such as aggression, or increase pro-social norms. We consider these in turn.
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If social connectedness reduces crime by increasing the probability that criminals are identified and punished, we should primarily see reductions in crimes that tend to be witnessed. However, Table 2 shows that social connectedness reduces crimes that are more and less likely to have witnesses: burglary and motor vehicle theft are less likely to have witnesses than robbery or assault, yet the estimates are similar in magnitude for all of these crimes.
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We partly examine other mechanisms by adding observed proxies to equation (1). For example, consider the black unemployment rate. If social connectedness increases the probability of employment for young adults and this decreases crime, then including the black unemployment rate in equation (1) would attenuate the coefficient on HHI. However, an attenuated coefficient would not necessarily imply that employment is a mechanism, as the reduction in crime could cause higher employment, or social connectedness could independently cause lower crime and higher employment. An attenuated coefficient only suggests the variable in question as a potential mechanism. On the other hand, if the estimated effect of HHI on crime does not change when adding a variable, this implies it is not a quantitatively important mechanism. for the 222 cities with non-missing African-American specific covariates. Appendix Table A.13 contains results for the 66 cities for which the Fryer et al. (2013) crack index is also available.
Column 1 contains the estimate of δ from our baseline specification. In column 2, we add black demographic and economic covariates, including the share of African Americans with a high school and college degree, and the black unemployment rate. Column 3 adds the black homeownership rate, column 4 adds the share of black households headed by a single female, and column 5 adds both of these variables. In column 6 of Appendix Table A .13, we add the crack index from Table 4 . There is more variation in Table A .13, which is not surprising given the smaller sample size; the most important takeaway is the lack of evidence that crack cocaine use is an important mechanism. In sum, Tables 4 and A.13 indicate that the effect of social connectedness on crime is not mediated by short-run effects on employment, education, homeownership, the prevalence of single parents, or crack cocaine use.
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To better understand the underlying mechanisms, we use FBI Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR), which provide additional details on offenders and victims for murders starting in 1976. Table 5 reports the estimated effect of social connectedness on murders, by victim characteristic and circumstance. The overall effect, in row 1, is very similar to the Table 2 estimate. Social connectedness leads to the largest reduction in murders committed during gang and drug activity. Social connectedness also leads to a sizable reduction in murders committed alongside other felonies.
The effects are smaller, but still sizable and precisely estimated, for murders that occur during arguments. For 28 percent of murders, the circumstance is unknown, mainly because the murder is not cleared by arrest. The largest effects are on murders committed with guns and for victims age 10-25. 33 Finally, the effects are larger in magnitude for murders committed by acquaintances and 32 Social connectedness also could affect the community's relationship with police. For example, individuals in more connected destinations might be more or less likely to report crimes to police or cooperate with investigations. Data limitations prevent a full examination of these issues, but the scope for under-or over-reporting of crimes is negligible for murder and relatively small for robbery and motor vehicle theft (Blumstein, 2000; Tibbetts, 2012) . Consistent with this, we estimate similar effects on homicides measured in vital statistics data, which do not require a police report (Appendix D). 33 We also estimate significant reductions in murders of individuals age 36 and older. Most of these victims are killed by younger offenders. Furthermore, social connectedness likely has persistent effects on individuals, by changing norms and skills or by reducing the tendency of crime to beget more crime (Nagin and Paternoster, 1991) ; these persistent effects would reduce the probability of committing crime in adulthood, thus reducing the chances of being murdered. To further examine mechanisms, Table 6 reports the effect of social connectedness by offender race, victim race, and circumstance. Column 2 reports the effect of social connectedness on murders committed by African Americans. While African Americans make up 16 percent of the population in our sample, they account for 56 percent of the murders for which offender race is available.
African Americans constitute 82 percent of the victims of black murderers. Among this group, social connectedness especially reduces murders that coincide with gang and drug activity and other felonies. Social connectedness leads to a smaller, but still sizable, reduction in murders that occur alongside arguments. Social connectedness also reduces murders of non-black victims by black offenders. 35 We again see particular reductions in murders that coincide with gang and drug activity, other felonies, and arguments. Furthermore, murders of non-black victims are more likely to occur in these circumstances, partly explaining the row 8 coefficient being larger than row 2.
Because African Americans are the vast majority of victims, the effect of social connectedness on murders of black victims by black offenders is quantitatively the most important.
Column 4 reports the effect of social connectedness on murders committed by non-black offenders. This reduction is driven primarily by fewer murders of black victims by non-black offenders, especially those associated with gang and drug activity, felonies, and arguments. Social connectedness also reduces murders of non-black victims by non-black offenders; these reductions are concentrated in gang and drug activity and felonies. Overall, the results in Table 6 are consistent with social connectedness among African Americans from the South having a direct effect on black offenders and an indirect effect on non-black offenders through peer effects and spillovers. The simple framework in Section 3 describes this equilibrium. While most murders are intraracial, the presence of interracial spillovers, as seen in the SHR data and qualitative accounts of drug and turf wars (Block and Block, 1993; Quadracci, 2007; Audi, 2011) , means that these spillovers are relevant. As crime can lead to more crime (e.g., through retaliatory murders), social connectedness can even reduce murders of non-black victims by non-black offenders. Further support for this interpretation comes from the fact that the interracial effects of social connectedness are on murders committed alongside gang, drug, and other felonious activity.
Based on all of these results and prior research (e.g., Stack, 1974; Nagin and Pogarsky, 2004; Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006; Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev, 2013; Heller et al., 2017; Stevenson, 2017) , the most likely mechanisms appear to be non-cognitive skills, personality traits, and anti-crime norms. Prior research suggests that these factors play a large role in interactions that adolescents and young adults have with strangers and acquaintances. For example, non-cognitive skills such as self-control and forward-looking behavior could prevent the escalation of conflicts into violence.
Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of social connectedness on crime across U.S. cities from 1970 to 2009. We use a new source of variation in social connectedness stemming from birth town migration networks among millions of African Americans from the South. A one standard deviation increase in social connectedness leads to a precisely estimated 21 percent decrease in murder and a 20 percent decrease in motor vehicle thefts. We find that social connectedness also leads to sizable and statistically significant reductions in rapes, robberies, assaults, and burglaries. Social connectedness reduces crimes that are more and less likely to have witnesses, which suggests that an increased detection probability is not the only mechanism. (1), using the same specification as Table 2 . The dependent variable is the number of murders, by the indicated offender race, victim race, and circumstance. To ensure that all estimates in Table 6 can be interpreted as elasticities of the crime rate, we add log black population to the models in rows 2-7 and constrain the coefficient to equal one. In rows 8-13, we do the same for the log non-black population. We construct an annual black population estimate by combining Census annual population estimates with a linear extrapolation of the African American population share from decennial census data. 
